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Abstract:  We use Morocco’s national survey of living standards to measure the 
short-term welfare impacts of prior estimates of the price changes attributed to 
various agricultural trade reform scenarios for de-protecting cereals — the 
country’s main foodstaple. We find small impacts on mean consumption and 
inequality in the aggregate. There are both winners and losers and (contrary to 
past claims) the rural poor are worse off on average after de-protection.  We 
decompose the aggregate impact on inequality into a “vertical” component 
(between people at different pre-reform welfare levels) and a “horizontal” 
component (between people at the same pre-reform welfare).  There is a large 
horizontal component, which dominates the vertical impact of full de-protection.  
The diverse impacts reflect a degree of observable heterogeneity in consumption 
behavior and income sources, with implications for social protection policies.     
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1. Introduction 
As a water-scarce country, Morocco does not have much natural advantage in the 
production of water-intensive crops such as most cereals, including wheat, which is used to 
produce the country’s main food staples.  The desire for aggregate self-sufficiency in the 
production of food staples has led in the past to governmental efforts to foster domestic cereal 
production, even though cereals can be imported more cheaply.  Since the 1980s, cereal 
producers have been protected by tariffs on imports as high as 100%.   
There have been concerns that the consequent reallocation of resources has hurt 
consumers and constrained the growth of production and trade.  Reform to the current incentive 
system for cereals has emerged as an important issue on the policy agenda for Morocco (World 
Bank, 2003).  The major obstacles to reform stem from concerns about the impacts on household 
welfare, particularly for the poor.  There has been very little careful research into who will gain 
and who will lose from such reforms. 
Nonetheless, there has been much debate about the equity implications.  It is generally 
agreed that urban consumers are likely to gain from lower cereal prices.  More contentious are 
the welfare distributional impacts in rural areas.  Defenders of the existing protection system 
have argued that there will be large welfare losses to the rural economy from trade reform.  
Critics have argued against this view, claiming that the bulk of the rural poor tend to be net 
consumers, and so lose out from the higher prices due to trade protection.  They argue that the 
rural poor are likely to gain from the reform, while it will be the well off in rural areas who tend 
to be net producers who will lose; see for example, Abdelkhalek (2002) and World Bank (2003).    
This paper studies the household welfare impacts of the relative price changes induced by 
specific trade policy reform scenarios for cereals in Morocco.  Past analyses of the welfare   4
impacts have been highly aggregated, focusing on just one or a few categories of households.  
Here we estimate impacts across 5,000 sampled households in the Morocco Living Standards 
Survey for 1998/99.  This allows us to provide a detailed picture of the welfare impacts, so as to 
better inform discussions of the social protection policy response to trade liberalization. 
Past approaches to studying the welfare impacts of specific trade reforms have tended to 
be either partial equilibrium analyses, in which the welfare impacts of the direct price changes 
due to tariff changes are measured at household level, or general equilibrium analyses, in which 
second-round responses are captured in a theoretically consistent way but with considerable 
aggregation across household types.  In general terms, the economics involved in both 
approaches is well known.  And both approaches have found numerous applications. 
We combine these two approaches.  In particular, the price changes induced by the trade-
policy change are simulated from a general equilibrium analysis done for a Joint Government of 
Morocco and World Bank Working Group.  We take the methods and results of that analysis as 
given and carry them to the Moroccan Living Standards survey.  Our approach respects the 
richness of detail available from a modern integrated household survey, allowing us to go well 
beyond the highly aggregative types of analysis one often finds.  We not only measure expected 
impacts across the distribution of initial levels of living, but we also look at how they vary by 
other characteristics, such as location.  We are thus able to provide a reasonably detailed “map” 
of the predicted welfare impacts by location and socio-economic characteristics. 
In studying the distributional impacts of trade reform we make a distinction between the 
“vertical impact” and “horizontal impact.” The former concerns the way the mean impacts vary 
with level of pre-reform income — how the reform affects people at different pre-reform 
incomes.  The horizontal impact relates to the disparities in impact between people at the same   5
pre-reform income.  As argued in Ravallion (2004), many past discussions of the distributional 
impacts of trade and other economy-wide reforms have tended to focus more on the vertical 
impacts, analogously to standard practices in studying the “benefit incidence” of tax and 
spending policies.   However, as we will demonstrate here, this focus may well miss an 
important component of a policy’s distributional impact, arising from the horizontal dispersion in 
impacts at given pre-reform incomes.  We show how the impact of a policy on a standard 
inequality measure can be straightforwardly decomposed into its vertical and horizontal 
components.  The former tells us how much of the change in total inequality can be accounted 
for by the way in which mean impacts conditional on pre-reform income vary with the latter.  If 
there is no difference in the proportionate impact by level of income, then the vertical component 
is zero.  The horizontal component tells us the contribution of the deviations in impacts from 
their conditional means.  Only when the impact of the reform is predicted perfectly by pre-
reform income will the horizontal component be zero.  We study the relative importance of these 
two components of our predicted distributional impact of trade reform in Morocco.        
The following section discusses our approach in general terms.  Section 3 presents our 
results in detail, while section 4 reviews the main findings.  
 
2.  Measuring and explaining the welfare impacts of reform using micro data 
We use pre-existing estimates of the household-level welfare impacts of the price changes 
generated by a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.  The CGE analysis generates a set 
of price changes; these embody both the direct price effects of the trade-policy change and 
indirect effects on the prices of both traded and non-traded goods once all markets respond to the 
reform.  Standard methods of first-order welfare analysis are used to measure the gains and 
losses at household level.   6
Our focus here is very much on the short-term welfare impacts.  In keeping with the 
limitations of the preceding general equilibrium analysis, our approach does not capture the 
dynamic effects of trade reform through labor market adjustment and technological innovation.  
Nor does it capture potential gains to the environment.
2 
The specifics of our approach to estimating welfare impacts at the household level can be 
outlined as follows.
3  Each household has preferences over consumption and work effort 
represented by the utility function  ) , ( i
d




i q  is a vector of the quantities of 
commodities demanded by household i and  i L  is a vector of labor supplies by activity, including 
supply to the household’s own production activities.
4  The household is assumed to be free to 
choose its preferred combinations of 
d
i q  and  i L  subject to its budget constraint.     
The household owns a production activity that generates a profit 
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household-specific cost function.
5  The indirect utility function of household i is given by: 
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where 
d
i p  is the price vector for consumption,  i w  is the vector of wage rates.  
                                                 
2   Though it is not a subject of the present analysis, arguments are also made about adverse 
environmental impacts arising from the expansion of protected cereal production into marginal areas, It is 
claimed that scarce water resources have also been diverted into soft wheat production.  For further 
discussion see World Bank (2003). 
3   There are many antecedents of our approach in the literatures on both tax reform and trade 
reform, though there are surprisingly few applications to point to in the ex ante assessment of actual 
reform proposals.  For another example see Chen and Ravallion (2004).  Hertel and Reimer (2004) 
provide a useful overview of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to assessing the 
welfare impacts of trade-policies, including references to empirical examples for developing countries.   
4   We make the standard assumptions that goods have positive marginal utilities while labor 
supplies have negative marginal utilities. 
5   On can readily include input prices in this cost function; see Chen and Ravallion (2004) for a 
more general formulation.  In the present context this makes no difference to the subsequent analysis so 
we subsume factor prices in the cost function to simplify notation.   7
We take the predicted price impacts from the CGE model as given for the analysis of 
household-level impacts.  In measuring the impacts we are constrained of course by the data, 
which do not include prices and wages.  However, this limitation does not matter to calculating a 
first-order approximation to the welfare impact in a neighborhood of the household’s optimum. 
Taking the differential of (1) and using the envelope property (whereby the welfare impacts in a 
neighborhood of an optimum can be evaluated by treating the quantity choices as given), the gain 
to household i (denoted  i g ) is given by the money metric of the change in utility: 
∑ ∑
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where  i vπ  is the marginal utility of income for household i (the multiplier on the budget 
constraint in equation 1) and 
s
ik L  is the household’s “external” labor supply to activity k. (Notice 
that gains in earnings from labor used in own production are exactly matched by the higher cost 
of this input to own-production.)   The proportionate changes in prices are weighted by their 










ijq p −  is the (negative) weight for demand price changes and 
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ij q p q p −  gives (to a first-order 
approximation) the welfare impact of an equi-proportionate increase in the price of commodity j.    
Equation (2) is the key formula we will use for calculating the welfare impacts at 
household level, given the predicted price changes.  In the specific model we will use (as 
discussed later), real wage rates are fixed.  So the last term on the right hand side of (2) drops 
out.  (We discuss likely implications of relaxing this assumption in section 3.5.)    8
Notice that by applying the calculus in deriving (2) we are implicitly assuming small 
changes in prices.  Relaxing this requires more information on the structure of the demand and 
supply system; see for example Ravallion and van de Walle (1991).  This would entail 
considerable further effort, and the reliability of the results will be questionable given the 
aforementioned problem of incomplete price and wage data.  For the same reason, we will have 
little choice but to largely ignore geographic differences in the prices faced, or in the extent to 
which border price changes are passed on locally.     
Having estimated the impacts at household level, we can study how they vary with pre-
reform welfare, and what impact the reform has on poverty and inequality.  Let  i y  denote the 
pre-reform welfare per person in household i while  i i i g y y + =
*  is its post-reform value, where 
i g is the gain to household i.  (Ideally,  i y will be an exact money-metric of utility, though in 
practice it can be expected that it is an approximation given omitted prices or characteristics.)  




1 ,... , n y y y .  By comparing standard summary 
measures of poverty or inequality for this distribution with those for the pre-reform distribution, 
n y y y ,... , 2 1 , we can assess overall impacts.   
Of obvious interest is to see how the gains vary with pre-reform welfare.  Is it the poor 
who tend to gain, or is it middle-income groups or the rich?  However, it is important to 
recognize that the assignment of impacts to the pre-reform distribution is very unlikely to be a 
degenerate distribution, with no distribution of its own.  There will almost certainly be a 
dispersion in impact at given pre-reform welfare.  This will arise from (observable and 
unobservable) heterogeneity in characteristics and prices.  It could also arise from errors in the   9
welfare measure.  Averaging across the distribution of impacts at given pre-reform welfare, one 
can calculate the conditional mean impact given by: 
   ) ( i i i
c
i y y g E g = =          ( 3 )  
where the expectation is formed over the conditional distributions of impacts.  By including a 
subscript i in the expectations operator in (3), we allow the possibility that the horizontal 
dispersion in impacts is not identically distributed.  In our empirical implementation, equation 
(3) will be estimated using a non-parametric regression.      
Taking these observations a step further, we can think of the overall impact on inequality 
as having both vertical and horizontal components.
6  This is straightforward for the mean log 
deviation (MLD) — an inequality measure known to have a number of desirable features.
7   The 
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=  is mean post-reform welfare.  Similarly, 
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is the pre-reform MLD.  (In both (4) and (5) it is assumed that  0 > i y  and  0
* > i y  for all i.  Thus  
I
*- I  is the change in inequality attributable to the reform.  The proposed decomposition of the 
overall change in inequality can then be written as: 
                                                 
6   Antecedents to this type of decomposition can be found in the literature on horizontal equity in 
taxation.  In the context of assessing a tax system, Auerbach and Hassett (2002) show how changes in an 
index of social welfare can be decomposed into terms reflecting changes in the level and distribution of 
income, the burden and progressivity of the tax system and a measure of the change in horizontal equity.   
7   For further discussion of the MLD see Bourguignon (1979) and Cowell (2000).  MLD is a 
member of the General Entropy class of inequality measures.   10
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                                                       vertical component  + horizontal component 
 
The vertical component is the contribution to the change in total inequality (I
*- I ) of the way in 
which mean impacts vary with pre-reform welfare levels.  If there is no difference in the 
proportionate impact by level of welfare ( y g y g i
c
i / / =  for all i) then the vertical component is 
zero.  The horizontal component is the contribution of the deviations in impacts from their 
conditional means.  If the impact of the reform is predicted perfectly by pre-reform welfare 
(
c
i i g g =  for all i) then the horizontal component is zero.  
  We also want to try and explain the differences in impacts in terms of observable 
characteristics of potential relevance to social protection policies.  The way we have formulated 
the problem of measuring welfare impacts above allows utility and profit functions to vary 
between households at given prices.  To try to explain the heterogeneity in measured welfare 
impacts we can suppose instead that these functions vary with observed household 
characteristics.  The indirect utility function becomes:   














i i L w q p x L q u x x w p p v w p p v π = − = =       (7) 








i i x q c q p x p − = =π π .  Note that we allow the characteristics that 
influence preferences over consumption ( i x1 ) to differ from those that influence the profits from 
own-production activities ( i x2 ).   
The gain from the price changes induced by trade reform, as given by equation (7), 
depends on the consumption, labor supply and production choices of the household, which 
depend in turn on prices and characteristics, i x1  and  i x2 .  For example, households with a higher 
proportion of children will naturally spend more on food, so if the relative price of food changes   11
then the welfare impacts will be correlated with this aspect of household demographics.  
Similarly, there may be differences in tastes associated with stage of the life cycle and education.  
There are also likely to be systematic covariates of the composition of welfare.   
Generically, we can now write the gain as: 




i i x x w p p g g =           ( 8 )    
However, we do not observe the household-specific wages and prices.  So we must make further 
assumptions.  In explaining the variation across households in the predicted gains from trade 
reform we assume that: (i) the wage rates are a function of prices and characteristics as 




i i x x p p w w =  and (ii) differences in prices faced can be adequately captured by a 
complete set of regional dummy variables.   
Under these assumptions, and linearizing (8) with an additive innovation error term,  we 
can write down the following regression model for the gains:   
  i
k
ki k i i i D x x g ε γ β β + + + = ∑ 2 2 1 1        ( 9 )
 
where  1 = ki D  if household i lives in county k and  0 = ki D  otherwise and  i ε  is the error term. 
 
3. Measured  welfare  impacts  of trade reform in Morocco 
3.1  The predicted price changes and the survey data 
The price changes (implied by trade reform) we use here were generated by a CGE model 
that was commissioned by a joint working group of the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of 
Morocco, and the World Bank, as documented in Doukkali (2003).  The model was constructed 
with the aim of realistically representing the functioning of the Moroccan economy around 1997-
98.  The model was explicitly designed to assess the aggregate impacts of de-protecting cereals 
in Morocco.  In addition to allowing for interactions between agriculture and the rest of the   12
economy (represented by six sectors), the model is quite detailed in its representation of the 
agricultural sector.  It allows for 16 different crops or groups of crops, three different livestock 
activities, 13 major agro-industrial activities, six agro-ecological regions, and within each region 
the model distinguishes between rainfed agriculture and four types of irrigated agriculture.  The 
model has two types of labor, both with fixed real wage rates.   
Four policy simulations are undertaken.  The simulations then differ in the extent of the 
tariff reductions for cereals, namely 10% (Policy 1), 30% (Policy 2), 50% (Policy 3) and 100% 
(Policy 4).  In all cases, the government’s existing open-market operations, which attempt to 
keep down consumer prices by selling subsidized cereals, are also removed.
8  The loss of 
revenue from a 50% tariff cut approximately equals the saving on subsidies.    
Table 1 gives the predicted prices changes for various trade liberalization scenarios, 
based on Doukkali (2003).
9  As one would expect, the largest price impact is for cereals, though 
there are some non-negligible spillovers into other markets, reflecting substitutions in 
consumption and production and welfare effects on demand.  Some of these spillover effects are 
compensatory.  For example, some producer prices rise with the de-protection of cereals. 
The survey data set used here is the Enquête National sur le Niveau de Vie Ménages 
(ENNVM) for 1998 done by the government’s Department of Statistics, which kindly provided 
the data set for the purpose of this study.  This is a comprehensive multi-purpose survey 
                                                 
8   In addition to administering the tariffs on imported soft wheat, the Government of Morocco buys, 
mills and sells around one million tons of soft wheat in the form of low grade flour, which is sold on the 
open market to help consumers. 
9   Rachid Doukkali kindly provided price predictions from the CGE model mapped into the 
categories of consumption and production identified in the survey.  The production revenues were 
calculated from the survey data by matching these consumption categories to the variables containing 
information about household production of the corresponding goods.   13
following the practices of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study.
10  The 
ENNVM has a sample of 5,117 households (of which 2,154 are rural) spanning 14 of Morocco’s 
16 regions (the low density southernmost region — the former Spanish Sahara — was excluded).  
The sample is clustered and stratified by region and urban/rural areas.  The survey did not 
include households without a fixed residence (“sans abris”).  The survey allows calculation of a 
comprehensive consumption aggregate (including imputed values for consumption from own 
production).  We used the consumption numbers calculated by the Department of Statistics.  This 
is our money metric of welfare.  Ideally this would be deflated by a geographic cost-of-living 
index, but no such index was available, given the aforementioned lack of geographic price data. 
3.2  Implied welfare impacts at household level 
Tables 2a,b give the budget and income shares at mean points and the mean welfare 
impacts broken down by commodity based on the ENNVM; Table 2a is for consumption while 
2b is for production.  Notice how different consumption patterns are between urban and rural 
areas; for example, rural households have twice the budget share for cereals as urban households.  
Strikingly, while there is a 1.7% gain to urban consumers as a whole, this is largely offset by the 
general equilibrium effects through other price changes (Table 2a).  Also notice that income 
obtained directly from production accounts for about one-quarter of consumption; the rest is 
labor earnings, transfers and savings.  Of course in rural areas, the share is considerably higher, 
at 87%.  And about one-third of this is from cereals.
11 
                                                 
10   The survey’s design and content are similar in most respects to the 1991 Living Standards Survey 
for Morocco documented in the LSMS web site: http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/ . 
11   Notice that there is no income from meat recorded in the data.  The most plausible explanation is 
that Moroccan farmers sell livestock to butchers or abattoirs rather than selling meat as such.  Following 
conventional survey processing practices, livestock is treated as an asset, so that proceeds from the selling 
of livestock is not treated as income.  This is questionable.  As a test, we redid our main calculations 
using the survey data on the transaction in livestock, and adding net sales into income.  This made 
negligible difference to the results.  Details are available from the authors.   14
Table 3 summarizes the results on the implied welfare impacts.  Our results indicate that 
the partial trade reforms have only a small positive impact on the national poverty rate, as given 
by the percentage of the population living below the official poverty lines for urban and rural 
areas used by the Government’s statistics office.
12  However, a larger impact emerges when we 
simulate complete de-protection (Policy 4).  Then the national poverty rate rises from 20% to 
22%.  All four reforms entail a decrease in urban poverty (though less than 0.4% points) and an 
increase in rural poverty.  (We will examine impacts over the whole distribution below.)  
Turning to the impacts on inequality in Table 3, we find that the trade reforms yield a 
small increase in inequality, with the Gini index rising from 0.385 in the base case to 0.395 with 
a complete de-protection of cereals (Policy 4).  Impacts are smaller for the partial reforms 
(Policies 1-3).  The overall per capita gain is positive for the smaller tariff reduction (Policy 1) 
but becomes negative for Policies 2, 3 and 4.  As one would expect, there is a net gain to 
consumers and net loss to producers, though the amounts involved are small overall.  There are 
small net gains in the urban sector for Policies 1-3.  Larger impacts are found in rural areas, as 
we would expect.  The mean percentage loss from complete de-protection is a (non-negligible) 
5.7% in rural areas. 
Table 3 gave our results for the impact on poverty as estimated using the government’s 
official poverty lines.  It is important to test robustness to alternative poverty lines.  For this 
purpose, we use the “poverty incidence curve,” which is simply the cumulative distribution 
function up to a reasonable maximum poverty line.  The results are given in Figure 1; to make 
the figure easier to read we focus on Policies 1 and 4.  (The curves for Policies 2 and 3 are 
between these two.)   
                                                 
12   These have been updated using the CPI.  The poverty lines were 3922 Dirham per year in urban 
areas and 3037 in rural areas.  See World Bank (2001) for details.   15
We see that there is an increase in poverty overall from complete de-protection; this is 
robust to the poverty line and poverty measure used (within a broad class of measures; see 
Atkinson, 1987).  The impact on poverty is almost entirely in rural areas; indeed, there is 
virtually no impact on urban poverty.  However, in rural areas the results in Figure 1 suggest a 
sizeable impact on poverty from complete de-protection.  The mean loss as a proportion of 
consumption for the poorest 15% in rural areas is about 10%.  There is an increase in the 
proportion of the rural population living below 2000 Dirham per person per year from 6.2% to 
9.9%; the proportion living below 3000 Dirham rises from 22.2% to 26.3%.  (For the country as 
a whole, the poverty rate for the former poverty line rises from 2.8% to 4.4% under Policy 4, 
while it rises from 11.4% to 13.1% for the 3000 Dirham line.) 
Our finding of adverse impacts on the rural poor contradicts claims made by some 
observers who have argued that the rural poor tend to be net consumers of cereals, the 
commodity that incurs the largest price decrease with this trade reform (Table 1).  We will return 
to this point when we study the welfare impacts further.      
Table 4 gives the mean impacts of Policy 4 by region, split urban and rural.  Impacts in 
urban areas are small in all regions, with the highest net gain as a percentage of consumption 
being 1.3% in Tanger-Tetouan, closely followed by Tensift Al Haouz and Fes-Boulemane.  The 
rural areas with largest mean losses from de-protection of cereals are Tasla Azilal, Meknes Tafil, 
Fes-Boulemane and Tanger-Tetouan.  Table 4 also gives mean impacts for the poorest 15% in 
rural areas (in terms of consumption per person).  When we focus on the rural poor defined this 
way, the region incurring the largest mean loss for rural households is Tanger-Tetouan, followed 
by Fes-Boulemane and Chaouia-Ouardigha.   The contrast between the small net gains to the 
urban sector and net losses to the rural poor is most marked in Tanger-Tetouan.     16
To begin exploring the heterogeneity in welfare impacts, Figure 2 gives the cumulative 
frequency distributions of the gains and losses.  To simplify the figure we again focus on Policies 
1 and 4.  We find that with complete de-protection (Policy 4) about 8.9% of the households 
incurred losses greater than 500 Dirhams per year (about 5% of overall mean consumption) 
while about 5% lose more than 1000 Dirhams per year.  As one would expect, there is a “thicker 
tail” of negative gains for rural areas.  About 16% of rural households lose more that 500 
Dirhams and 10% lose more than 1000. 
In Figure 3 we plot the mean gains against percentiles of consumption per capita for 
Policies 1 and 4.  We give both absolute gains/losses and gains as a percentage of the 
household’s consumption.  For policy 1, there is a tendency for the mean absolute gain to rise as 
one moves from the poorest percentile through to the richest, though the gradient is small.  The 
mean proportionate gain is quite flat.  For Policy 4, mean absolute impacts also rise up to the 
richest decile or so, but then fall.  Proportionate gains follow the same pattern though (again) the 
gradient seems small.   
However, what is most striking from Figure 3 is the wide spread, particularly downwards 
(indicating losers from the reform).  The variance in absolute impacts is particularly large at the 
upper end of the consumption distribution, though if anything the dispersion in proprotionate 
impacts tends to be greater at the other end of the distribution, amongst the poorest.   
In Figure 4 we provide a split between producers and consumers for Policy 4.  As we 
would expect, to the extent that there is much impact on producers, they tend to lose, though not 
more so for poor producers than rich ones.  For consumption we tend to see more gainers, and a 
higher variance in impact as one moves up the consumption distribution.  However, we see that   17
the downward dispersion in total welfare impacts in Figure 3 is due more to the conditional 
variance in impacts through production than through consumption.  
There are two quite striking findings in these figures.  Firstly, notice that there are 
sizeable losses on the production side amongst the poor. Granted, some large losses are evident 
for the high-income groups.  But the claims that the poor do not lose as producers are clearly 
false.  Furthermore, the poor are often not seeing compensatory gains as consumers.   
Secondly, it is notable that the results in Figures 3 and 4 indicate that the mean gains vary 
little with mean consumption.  Focusing on the “poor” versus the “rich” is hardly of much 
interest in characterizing gainers and losers from this reform. The diversity in impacts tend to be 
“horizontal” in the distribution of income, meaning that there tend to be larger differences in 
impacts at given consumption than in mean impacts between different levels of consumption. 
Next we examine these two findings in greater detail. 
3.3   Who are the net producers of cereals in Morocco? 
In the population as a whole, we find that 16% of households are net producers (value of 
cereals production exceeds consumption).  These households are worse off from the fall in cereal 
prices due to de-protection.  In rural areas, the proportion is 36%.   
However, the survey data do not support the claim that the rural poor in Morocco are on 
average net consumers of cereals.  Figure 5 shows how producers and net producers are spread 
across the distribution of total household consumption per person in rural Morocco.  We give 
both the scatter of points and the conditional means estimated using the local regression 
method.
13  In the first (top left) panel we give the proportion of producers.  Then we give the 
proportion of net producers (for whom production exceeds consumption of cereals in value 
                                                 
13   See Cleveland (1979).  This is often referred to as LOWESS (Locally Weighted Scatter Plot 
Smoothing).  We used the LOWESS program in STATA.    18
terms).  Finally we give net production in value terms.  In each case the horizontal axis gives the 
percentile of the distribution of consumption from poorest through to richest. 
We find that a majority of the rural poor produce cereals.  Naturally much of this is for 
home consumption.  However, even if we focus solely on net producers, we find that over one- 
third of the poorest quintile tend to produce more than they consume.  Furthermore, the mean net 
production in value terms tends to be positive for the poor; in rural areas, the losses to poor 
producers from falling cereal prices outweigh the gains to poor consumers.  More than any single 
feature of the survey data, it is this fact that lies at the heart of our finding that the rural poor lose 
from the reform. 
3.4  Vertical versus horizontal  impacts on inequality   
To measure the relative importance of the vertical versus horizontal differences in 
impact, we can use the decomposition method outlined in section 2.  This decomposition requires 
an estimate of the conditional mean  ) ( y g E , i.e., the regression function of g on y.  We estimated 
this using the nonparametric local regression method of Cleveland (1979). 
Table 5 gives the results of this decomposition for each policy reform.  For the small 
partial reform under Policy 1, the vertical component dominates, accounting for 73% of the 
impact on inequality.  However, as one moves to the larger reforms, the horizontal component 
becomes relatively large.  Indeed, we find that 119.8% of the impact of Policy 4 on inequality is 
attributable to the horizontal component, while -19.8% is due to the vertical component.  So we 
find that the vertical component was inequality reducing for Policy 4, even though overall 
inequality rose (Table 5).  
There is clearly a high degree of horizontal inequality in measured impacts at given mean 
consumption.  Some of this is undoubtedly measurement error, which may well become more   19
important for larger reforms.  But some is attributable to observable covariates of consumption 
and production behavior, as discussed in section 2.  In trying to explain this variance in welfare 
impacts, the characteristics we consider include region of residence, whether the household lives 
in an urban area, household size and demographic composition of the household, age and age-
squared of the household head, education and dummy variables describing some key aspects of 
the occupation and principle sector of employment; Table 6 gives summary statistics on the 
variables to be used in the regressions. We recognize that there are endogeneity concerns about 
these variables, though we think those concerns are minor in this context, especially when 
weighed against the concerns about omitted variable bias in estimates that exclude these 
characteristics.  Under the usual assumption that the error term is orthogonal to these regressors, 
we estimate equation (9) by ordinary least squares.         
The results are given in Table 7.  Recall that these are averages across the impacts of 
these characteristics on the consumption and production choices that determine the welfare 
impact of given price and wage changes.  This makes interpretation difficult.  We view these 
regressions as being mainly of descriptive interest, to help isolate covariates of potential 
relevance in thinking about compensatory policy responses.  
Focusing first on the results for Policy 4, we find that larger losses from full de-protection 
of cereals are associated with families living in rural areas, that are relatively smaller (the turning 
point in the U-shaped relationship is at a household size of about one), have more wage earners, 
higher education, work in commerce, transport etc., and live in Chaouia-Ouardigha, Rabat, Tadla 
Azilal and Meknes Tafil.  Recall that these effects stem from the way household characteristics 
influence net trading positions in terms of the commodities for which prices change.  So, for 
example, it appears that larger families tend to consume more cereals, and so gain more from the   20
lower cereals prices.  Results are similar for partial de-protection, though education becomes 
insignificant for Policy 1.   
In Table 8 we give an urban-rural breakdown of the regressions for Policies 1 and 4.  
There are a couple of notable differences.  (Again we focus on Policy 4 in the interests of 
brevity.)  We find significant positive effects of having more children and teenagers on the gains 
from trade reform in rural areas, presumably because such families are more likely to be cereal 
consumers.  The education effect at higher levels of schooling is much more pronounced in 
urban areas.  The effect of working in the transport and commerce sector is more statistically 
significant in urban areas, though this effect is still sizeable in rural areas.  The regional effects 
are more statistically significant in urban areas than in rural areas.  Of course there are still 
sizable regional differences in mean impacts in Table 8, though they are statistically less 
significant than we found in Table 7.  In fact the quantitative magnitudes of the regional 
differences are just as large for rural areas in Table 8 as for urban plus rural areas in Table 7. 
It should not be forgotten that the results in Tables 7 and 8 are conditional geographic 
effects (conditional on the values taken by other covariates in the regressions).  As we saw in 
Table 4, there are pronounced (unconditional) geographic differences in mean impacts in rural 
areas across different regions.  Whether one draws policy lessons more from the conditional or 
unconditional effects depends on the type of policy one is using.  If it is simply regional 
targeting, then of course the unconditional geographic effects in Table 4 will be more relevant.  
However, finer targeting by household characteristics, in combination with regional targeting, 
will call for the sorts of results presented in Tables 7 and 8.   
  The share of the variance in gains that is accountable to these covariates is generally less 
than 10%.  Values of R
2 of this size are common in regressions run on large cross-sectional data   21
sets, though it remains true that a large share of the variance in impacts is not accountable to 
these covariates.  (The exception to our low R
2 is for Policy 1, for which almost half of the 
variance in gains across urban households is explained.)  It must be expected that there is a 
sizable degree of measurement error in the gains, stemming from measurement error in the 
underlying consumption and production data.  No doubt there are also important idiosyncratic 
factors in household-specific tastes or production choices.   
These regressions try to explain the variance in the gains from the reform.  It is of interest 
to see if we can do any better in explaining the incidence of losses from reform amongst the 
poor.  This is arguably of greater relevance to compensatory policies, which would presumably 
want to focus on poor losers.  To test how well the same set of regressors could explain who was 
a poor loser from the reforms, we constructed a dummy variable taking the value unity if a rural  
household incurred a negative loss and was “poor”; to assure a sufficient number of observations 
taking the value unity we set the poverty line higher than the official line, namely at a 
consumption per person of 5,000 Dirham per year (rather than the official line of about 3,000).  
(We confined this to rural areas since that is where the losses are concentrated.)  In the case of 
full de-protection (Policy 4), we find that about 14% of the variance in this measure can be 
explained by the set of regressors in Table 8, while for Policy 1 the share is 20%.
14  While there 
are a number of identifiable covariates for identifying likely losers amongst the poor, it is also 
clear that there is a large share of the variance left unexplained. 
Another way to assess how effectively this set of covariates can explain the incidence of 
a net loss from reform amongst the poor is by comparing the actual value of the dummy variable 
described above with its predicted values from the model, using a cut-off probability of 0.5.  For 
                                                 
14   The R
2 for OLS regressions are 0.139 and 0.191 for Policy 4 and 1 respectively. Using instead a 
probit model to correct for the nonlinearity the pseudo R
2’s are 0.135 and 0.196.   22
Policy 4, there are 472 households out of 2,100 who were both poor and incurred a loss due to 
the reform.  Of these the model could only correctly predict that this was the case for 18% (86 
households).  For Policy 1, the model prediction was correct for 27% of the 463 households who 
were both poor and were made worse off by the reform.     
Yet most forms of indicator targeting — whereby transfers are contingent on readily 
observed variables, such as location — would be based on similar variables to those we have 
used in our regressions; indeed, if anything targeted policies use fewer dimensions.  This 
suggests that indicator targeting will be of only limited effectiveness in reaching those in greatest 
need.  Self-targeting mechanisms that create incentives for people to correctly reveal their status 
(such as using work requirements) may be better able to do so.   
3.5     Two caveats 
While the above results are suggestive, two limitations of our analysis should be noted.  
The first stems from the fact that the Doukkali (2003) model assumed fixed wage rates.  While 
sensitivity to alternative labor market assumptions should be checked, we can speculate on the 
likely impacts of allowing real wages to adjust to the reforms.  Here it can be argued that the 
export-oriented cash crops that will replace cereals will tend to be more labor intensive than 
cereals.  Thus we would expect higher aggregate demand for the relatively unskilled labor used 
in agriculture, and hence higher real wages for relatively poorer groups.  This will undoubtedly 
go some way toward compensating the rural poor, and may even tilt the vertical distributional 
impacts in favor of the poor.   
A second concern is that there may well be dynamic gains from greater trade openness 
that are not being captured by the model used to generate the relative price impacts; for example, 
trade may well facilitate learning about new agricultural technologies and innovation that brings   23
longer-term gains in farm productivity.  These effects may be revealed better by studying time 
series evidence, combined with cross-country comparisons.   
 
4. Conclusions   
The welfare impacts of de-protection in developing countries have been much debated.  
Some people have argued that external trade liberalizations are beneficial to the poor, while 
others argue that the benefits will be captured more by the non-poor. Expected impacts on 
domestic prices have figured prominently in these debates.   
The paper has studied the welfare impacts at household level of the changes in 
commodity prices attributed to a proposed trade reform, namely Morocco’s de-protection of its 
cereals sector.  This would entail a sharp reduction in tariffs, with implications for the domestic 
structure of prices and hence household welfare. The paper draws out the implications for 
household welfare of the previous estimates of the price impacts of reform done for a Joint 
Government of Morocco and World Bank Committee.  Standard methods of first-order welfare 
analysis are used to measure the gains and losses at household level using a large sample survey. 
In a number of respects, our detailed household-level analysis throws into question past 
claims about the likely welfare impacts of this trade reform.  In the aggregate, we find a small 
negative impact on mean household consumption and a small increase in inequality.  There is a 
sizable, and at least partly explicable, variance in impacts across households.  Rural families tend 
to lose; urban households tend to gain.  There are larger impacts in some provinces than others, 
with the greatest negative impacts for rural households in Tasla Azilal, Meknes Tafil, Fes-
Boulemane and Tanger-Tetouan.  Mean impacts for rural households in these regions are 10% or 
more of consumption.  There are clearly sizeable welfare losses amongst the poor in these 
specific regions.   24
The adverse impact on rural poverty stems in large part from the fact that the losses to the 
net producers of cereals outweigh the gains to the net consumers amongst the poor.  Thus, on 
balance rural poverty rises.  This contradicts the generalizations that have been made in the past 
that the rural poor in Morocco tend to be net consumers of grain, and hence gainers from trade 
reform.  Yes, a majority are net consumers, but on balance the welfare impacts on the rural poor 
are negative.   
Our results lead us to question the high level of aggregation common in past claims about 
welfare impacts of trade reform.  We find diverse impacts at given pre-reform consumption 
levels.  This “horizontal” dispersion becomes more marked as the extent of reform (measured by 
the size of the tariff cut) increases.  Indeed, we estimate that all of the impact of complete de-
protection of cereals on inequality is horizontal rather than vertical; the vertical impact on 
inequality was actually inequality reducing.  For a modest reform of a 10% cut in tariffs, the 
vertical component dominates, though there is still a large horizontal component.  It is clear from 
our results that in understanding the social impacts of this reform, one should not look solely at 
income poverty and income inequality as conventionally measured; rather one needs to look at 
impacts along “horizontal” dimensions, at given income. 
We have been able to identify some specific types of households whose consumption and 
production behavior makes them particularly vulnerable.  These results are suggestive of the 
targeting priorities for compensatory programs.  The fact that we also find a large share of 
unexplained variance in impacts also points to the limitations of targeting based on readily 
observable indicators, suggesting that self-targeting mechanisms may also be needed.   Table 1: Predicted price changes due to agricultural trade reform in Morocco  
 
Consumers (% change in prices)  Producers (% change in prices)  Sectors 
Policy 1  Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 1 Policy 2  Policy 3 Policy 4
          
Cereals and cereals products  -3.062  -7.786 -12.811 -26.691 -2.858 -7.193  -11.744 -24.107
Fresh vegetables  -0.714  -0.884 -1.051 -1.128 -0.580 -0.767 -0.871 -0.756
Fruits -0.637  -0.681 -0.683 -0.139 -0.429 -0.301 -0.104 0.843
Dairy products and eggs  -0.472  -0.414 -0.257 0.751 -0.505 -0.487 -0.333 0.637
Meat (red and poultry)  -0.320  -0.109 0.332 1.896 -0.306 -0.078  0.357 1.936
Sugar -0.200  0.100 0.400 1.300 -0.368 -0.378  -0.354 -0.094
Edible oils  -0.671  -1.064 -1.405 -2.225 -0.632 -0.998 -1.336 -2.061
Fresh and processed fish  0.000  0.696 1.300 2.996 0.000 0.600  1.300 2.881
Other ag.  and processed food  -0.369  -0.402 -0.421 -0.635 0.268 1.294  2.475 5.388
Services 0.142  0.500 0.758 1.460 0.056 0.500  0.844 1.708
Energy, electricity and water  -0.060  0.540 1.140 2.580 -0.051 0.549  1.149 2.597
Other industries  0.000  0.600 1.200 2.800 0.000 0.600  1.200 2.793
 
Note: The tariff cuts on imported cereals are 10%, 30%, 50% and 100% for Policies 1,2,3 and 4 respectively.   26













Cereals  0.084  0.2572 0.6540 1.0761 2.2420 
Fresh vegetables  0.042  0.0297 0.0368 0.0437 0.0469 
Fruits  0.022  0.0139 0.0148 0.0148 0.0030 
Dairy products and eggs  0.032  0.0153 0.0134 0.0083 -0.0243 
Meat (red and poultry)  0.112  0.0359 0.0122 -0.0373  -0.2129 
Sugar  0.015  0.0030 -0.0015 -0.0060 -0.0195 
Edible oils   0.032  0.0212 0.0336 0.0444 0.0703 
Fresh and processed fish  0.013  0.0000 -0.0089 -0.0166 -0.0383 
Ag. and processed food  0.101  0.0371 0.0405 0.0424 0.0640 
Services  0.066  -0.0094 -0.0332 -0.0504 -0.0971 
Energy, electricity, water  0.148  0.0089 -0.0799 -0.1688 -0.3819 
Other industries  0.333  0.0000 -0.2000 -0.4001 -0.9335 
Total  1.000  0.4127 0.4817 0.5506 0.7187 
Urban 
Cereals  0.066  0.2034 0.5172 0.8510 1.7730 
Fresh  vegetables  0.037  0.0264 0.0327 0.0389 0.0417 
Fruits  0.022  0.0139 0.0149 0.0149 0.0030 
Dairy products and eggs  0.034  0.0160  0.0141  0.0087  -0.0255 
Meat (red and poultry)  0.107  0.0342  0.0116  -0.0355  -0.2027 
Sugar 0.011  0.0021  -0.0011  -0.0042  -0.0138 
Edible  oils    0.024  0.0163 0.0258 0.0341 0.0540 
Fresh and processed fish  0.014  0.0000  -0.0096  -0.0180  -0.0414 
Ag. and processed food  0.096  0.0354  0.0386  0.0404  0.0610 
Services  0.067  -0.0095 -0.0333 -0.0505 -0.0973 
Energy, electricity, water  0.155  0.0093  -0.0835  -0.1763  -0.3990 
Other industries  0.368  0.0000  -0.2207  -0.4414  -1.0300 
Total  1.000  0.3476 0.3067 0.2621 0.1231 
Rural 
Cereals  0.136  0.4154 1.0565 1.7383 3.6217 
Fresh  vegetables  0.055  0.0394 0.0487 0.0579 0.0622 
Fruits  0.021  0.0137 0.0146 0.0146 0.0030 
Dairy products and eggs  0.028  0.0131  0.0114  0.0071  -0.0208 
Meat (red and poultry)  0.128  0.0410  0.0139  -0.0425  -0.2427 
Sugar 0.028  0.0056  -0.0028  -0.0112  -0.0364 
Edible  oils    0.053  0.0356 0.0564 0.0746 0.1181 
Fresh and processed fish  0.010  0.0000  -0.0068  -0.0126  -0.0291 
Ag. and processed food  0.115  0.0422  0.0461  0.0482  0.0728 
Services  0.066  -0.0094 -0.0330 -0.0501 -0.0965 
Energy, electricity, water  0.129  0.0077  -0.0694  -0.1466  -0.3317 
Other industries  0.232  0.0000  -0.1392  -0.2785  -0.6498 
Total  1.000  0.6042 0.9964 1.3993 2.4708   27
Table 2b:  Percentage gains from each policy: Production component 
 
 Production   











Cereals  0.089  -0.2713 -0.6899 -1.1352 -2.3652 
Fresh vegetables  0.053  -0.0381 -0.0471 -0.0560 -0.0601 
Fruits  0.041  -0.0261 -0.0279 -0.0280 -0.0057 
Dairy products and eggs  0.051  -0.0243 -0.0213 -0.0132 0.0386 
Meat (red and poultry)  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sugar  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Edible oils   0.025  -0.0169 -0.0268 -0.0354 -0.0560 
Fresh and processed fish  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ag. and processed food  0.002  -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0013 
Services  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Energy, electricity, water  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other industries  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total  0.262  -0.3774 -0.8139 -1.2687 -2.4498 
Urban 
Cereals  0.010  -0.0311 -0.0792 -0.1303 -0.2716 
Fresh vegetables  0.008  -0.0058 -0.0072 -0.0086 -0.0092 
Fruits  0.016  -0.0105 -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0023 
Dairy products and eggs  0.007  -0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0017 0.0049 
Meat (red and poultry)  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sugar  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Edible oils   0.013  -0.0087 -0.0138 -0.0183 -0.0289 
Fresh and processed fish  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ag. and processed food  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Services  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Energy, electricity, water  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other industries  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total  0.054  -0.0593 -0.1142 -0.1701 -0.3071 
Rural 
Cereals  0.319  -0.9777 -2.4863 -4.0910 -8.5235 
Fresh vegetables  0.186  -0.1329 -0.1645 -0.1955 -0.2099 
Fruits  0.113  -0.0722 -0.0771 -0.0773 -0.0158 
Dairy products and eggs  0.183  -0.0865 -0.0758 -0.0471 0.1375 
Meat (red and poultry)  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sugar  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Edible oils   0.061  -0.0409 -0.0649 -0.0857 -0.1357 
Fresh and processed fish  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ag. and processed food  0.008  -0.0031 -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0053 
Services  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Energy, electricity, water  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other industries  0.000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total  0.870  -1.3131 -2.8719 -4.5000 -8.7527   28
Table 3: Household impacts of four trade reforms 
 
  Baseline  Policy 1  Policy 2  Policy 3  Policy 4 
National 
Poverty  rate  (%)  19.61 20.01 20.33 21.04 22.13 
Mean Log Deviation (x100)  28.50  28.92  29.00  29.14  29.17 
Gini  index  0.385 0.387 0.389 0.391 0.395 
Per capita gain  0  6.519  -23.967  -54.816  -133.81 
Mean % gain: price changes 
weighted by mean shares  0 -0.059  -0.513  -0.971  -2.141 
Mean % gain: weighted by 
ratios of means (Tables 2a,b)   0 0.035  -0.332  -0.718  -1.731 
Production gain  0  -32.078  -69.012  -106.308  -201.017 
Consumption gain  0  38.598  45.046  51.492  67.207 
Consumption  per  capita  9350.913 9357.433 9326.947 9296.097 9217.104 
Urban 
Poverty  rate  (%)  12.19 12.05 11.96 12.05 11.76 
Mean Log Deviation (x100)  25.49  25.41  25.32  25.23  24.93 
Gini  index  0.366 0.365 0.365 0.364 0.362 
Per capita gain  0  35.518  24.8  13.747  -16.491 
Mean % gain: price changes 
weighted by mean shares  0 0.357  0.374  0.394  0.442 
Mean % gain: weighted by 
ratios of means (Tables 2a,b)   0  0.288  0.193  0.092  -0.184 
Production gain  0  -6.308  -12.103  -17.793  -31.302 
Consumption gain  0  41.826  36.903  31.54  14.811 
Consumption per capita  12031.2  12066.72  12056  12044.95  12014.71 
Rural 
Poverty  rate  (%)  28.28 29.31 30.10 31.54 34.25 
Mean Log Deviation (x100)  17.47  17.82  17.82  17.93  17.76 
Gini  index  0.312 0.313 0.315 0.318 0.328 
Per capita gain  0  -33.532  -91.321  -149.512  -295.845 
Mean % gain: price changes 
weighted by mean shares  0 -0.634  -1.737  -2.855  -5.708 
Mean % gain: weighted by 
ratios of means (Tables 2a,b)   0  -0.709  -1.875  -3.101  -6.282 
Production gain  0  -67.671  -147.612  -228.562  -435.419 
Consumption gain  0  34.139  56.291  79.049  139.574 
Consumption  per  capita  5649.034 5615.502 5557.712 5499.522 5353.189 
 
Note: All monetary units are Moroccan Dirham per year.  MLD is only calculated over the set of households for 
whom consumption is positive. The mean % gains weighted by mean shares are simply the means across the sample 
of the % gains at household level.  The second mean % gain is weighted by shares at the means points based on  
Tables 2a,b.   29
Table 4: Mean gains from Policy 4 by region  
 
Region Total  Urban  Rural 
      
Poorest 15% of 
rural households
Oued Ed-Dahab-Lagouira  -0.2  -0.2  .  . 
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia El Hamra  -0.34  -0.34  .  . 
Guelmime Es-Semara  -0.96  0.72  -3.47  -0.58 
Souss-Massa-Daraa -1.31  0.42  -2.4  -3.09 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hssen  -2.16  0.02  -3.86  0.1 
Chaouia-Ouardigha -4.18  0.32  -8.31  -10.11 
Tensift Al Haouz  -0.87  1.12  -2.17  0.31 
Oriental -0.87  0.38  -2.78  0.25 
G.Casablanca 0.48  0.41  2.41  . 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer -0.59  0.33  -4.98  0.23 
Doukala Abda  -3.13  0.76  -5.92  -3.93 
Tadla Azilal  -6.93  -0.71  -11.04  -0.95 
Meknes Tafil  -4.89  -0.19  -11.35  -8.48 
Fes-Boulemane -2.4  1.05  -11.52  -13.43 
Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate  -4.47 -0.32 -5.78 -8.39 
Tanger-Tetouan -2.94  1.31  -9.4  -22.03 
Total -2.14  0.45  -5.71  -10.39 
Note: Means formed over the household level % gains (equivalent to weighting proportionate  
price changes by mean shares).  
 
 
Table 5: Decomposition of the impact on inequality 
 
  Policy 1  Policy 2  Policy 3  Policy 4 
Vertical component  72.69  57.57  38.77  -19.77 
Horizontal component  27.31  42.43  61.23  119.77 
Total 100  100  100  100 
 
Note: The decomposition is only implemented on the sample of households for whom both the baseline 
and post-reform consumption is positive.  30
Table 6: Summary statistics on explanatory variables in the regression analysis 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev 
Urban   0.580  binary 
Log household size  1.645  0.550 
Log household size 2  3.009  1.621 
Female headed household   0.170  binary 
If unemployed present  0.248  binary 
Number of wage earners  5.912  2.878 
Share of children 0-6  0.140  0.162 
Share of children 7-17  0.221  0.204 
Share of elderly 60+  0.120  binary 
Characteristics of the head     
Age of the head  0.505  0.143 
Age of the head 2  0.275  0.155 
Illiterate head  0.582  binary 
Incomplete primary school  0.100  binary 
Primary school completed  0.164  binary 
Low secondary school  0.058  binary 
Upper secondary school  0.059  binary 
University 0.036  binary 
Industry    
Not-employed   0.240  binary 
Industrie/B.T.P 0.004  binary 
Commerce/Transp./Commun./Admin. 0.273  binary 
Service Soci.  0.085  binary 
Autres services  0.064  binary 
Corps Exter.  0.125  binary 
Chomeur 0.012  binary 
Femme au foyeur/Eleve/Etudiant  0.037  binary 
Jeune enfant  0.009  binary 
Vielliard/Retraite/Rentiers 0.074  binary 
Infirme/malade 0.068  binary 
 Autre inactifs  0.010  binary 
Regions    
Oued Ed-Dahab-Lagouira  0.012  binary 
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia El Hamra  0.014  binary 
Guelmime Es-Semara  0.023  binary 
Souss-Massa-Daraa 0.094  binary 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hssen  0.058  binary 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 0.054  binary 
Tensift Al Haouz  0.100  binary 
Oriental 0.065  binary 
G.Casablanca 0.124  Binary 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer 0.081  Binary 
Doukala Abda  0.067  Binary 
Tadla Azilal  0.047  Binary   31
Meknes Tafil  0.072  binary 
Fes-Boulemane 0.051  binary 
Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate  0.058  binary 
   32
Table 7: Regression of per capita gain/loss on selected household characteristics 
 
  Policy 1  Policy 2  Policy 3  Policy 4 
  Coeff.     s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. 
Urban   26.139***  6.275  44.850*** 12.948  64.218**  20.068  113.714** 39.213 
Log household size  -57.242**  19.583  -78.454* 40.407  -100.548  62.626  -157.373 122.376 
Log household size 2  77.337***  16.806  167.523*** 34.678  260.865***  53.746  508.026*** 105.023 
Female headed household   2.502  7.431  4.072 15.333  5.605  23.765  9.161 46.438 
If unemployed present  10.018*  5.909  23.344* 12.192  36.428*  18.896  67.997* 36.924 
Number of wage earners  -44.722***  7.019  -101.428*** 14.484  -159.842***  22.448  -313.541*** 43.865 
Share of children 0-6  32.783*  17.72  89.774* 36.564  145.705*  56.67  277.637* 110.736 
Share of children 7-17  25.070*  14.155  69.367* 29.206  113.738*  45.266  221.518* 88.453 
Share of elderly 60+  -21.3  15.584  -23.551 32.155  -24.389  49.837  -24.334 97.385 
Characteristics of the head          
  Age of the head  -38.511  108.759 -151.473 224.41  -272.681 347.809  -624.596 679.642 
  Age of the head 2  44.097  102.579 142.598 211.658 246.231 328.045  543.07 641.022 
  Household is literate 
only  -8.871  7.983  -23.441 16.472  -38.257  25.53  -76.735 49.888 
Incomplete primary 
education  Reference 
Primary school completed  -14.013*  6.757  -40.623** 13.942  -68.220**  21.608  -141.296*** 42.224 
Low secondary school  -12.98  10.4  -61.634** 21.458  -112.583***  33.258  -250.335*** 64.989 
Upper secondary school  -12.462  10.775  -70.619** 22.233  -130.320***  34.458  -286.333*** 67.333 
University 2.575  13.527  -95.376*** 27.912  -197.887***  43.26  -476.077*** 84.533 
Industry    
Not-working/Agriculture   Reference 
Industrie/B.T.P -3.71  36.465 -0.277 75.242 4.541  116.616 21.281 227.874
Commerce/Transport/ 
 Communications/Admin.  -59.926*** 8.198 -122.454*** 16.915 -185.113***  26.216 -341.751*** 51.228
Service Soci.  4.424  10.036 17.18 20.707 30.536 32.094 66.804 62.714
Autres services  -0.2  11.251 9.572 23.214 19.812  35.98 47.874 70.306
Corps Exter.  2.385  8.936 6.785 18.439 10.912  28.579 20.23 55.844
Chomeur 6.627  21.518 27.715 44.399 49.65  68.813 107.951 134.465
Femme au 
foyeur/Eleve/Etudiant 2.26  13.49  13.788 27.835  25.401  43.141  55.785 84.301 
Jeune enfant  7.629  24.5  -3.891 50.553  -16.336  78.352  -51.207 153.104 
  
Vielliard/Retraite/Rentiers 6.913  11.039  23.527 22.778  40.651  35.303  86.8 68.984 
  Infirme/malade  3.143  10.96  22.092 22.614  42.489  35.049  100.065 68.488 
  Autre inactifs  -9.955  22.723  1.817 46.885  15.364  72.667  56.497 141.995 
Regions            
Oued Ed-Dahab-Lagouira  19.216  22.51  -6.738 46.446  -34.818  71.986  -111.388 140.665 
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia 
El Hamra  -1.502  21.067  -20.145 43.47  -40.764  67.374  -98.323 131.652 
Guelmime Es-Semara  9.666  16.639  11.901 34.333  12.774  53.212  12.391 103.979 
Souss-Massa-Daraa -7.645  10.868  5.611 22.425  22.766  34.756  85.2 67.916 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni 
Hssen  -10.087  12.229  -7.485 25.232  -3.592  39.107  10.494 76.418 
Chaouia-Ouardigha -19.542  12.507  -49.255* 25.807  -81.319*  39.998  -169.114* 78.159   33
 Tensift Al Haouz  2.964  10.696  14.527 22.071  27.258  34.207  65.274 66.842 
Oriental -14.038  11.928  -19.198 24.612  -23.918  38.145  -31.056 74.539 
G.Casablanca -3.322  10.429  -15.762 21.518  -28.418  33.35  -60.086 65.169 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-
Zaer -15.439  11.326  -33.817 23.371  -52.199  36.222  -97.061 70.78 
Doukala Abda  -13.169  11.76  -23.668 24.265  -34.315  37.607  -59.462 73.487 
Tadla Azilal  -55.774***  13.093  -114.700*** 27.016  -174.099***  41.872  -320.810*** 81.821 
Meknes Tafil  -37.594**  11.54  -74.192** 23.812  -111.929**  36.906  -209.391** 72.117 
Fes-Boulemane -10.249  12.726  -15.356 26.259  -20.651  40.699  -33.326 79.528 
Taza-Al Hoceima-
Taounate  5.613  12.367  2.43 25.517  -2.415  39.549  -21.329 77.281 
Tanger-Tetouan Reference 
Constant 144.096***  34.638  247.104*** 71.472 354.469**  110.773 642.381** 216.458 
R
2 0.175  0.080  0.062  0.057   34
Table 8: Urban-rural split of regressions for per capita gains 
  
 Urban  Rural 
  Policy 1  Policy 4  Policy 1  Policy 4 
 Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. 
Log household size  -32.840*  16.071  45.705 83.159  -89.255* 45.084  -527.017* 294.353 
Log household size 2  40.492*  17.841  217.663* 92.32  79.415* 32.524  555.880** 212.348 
Female headed household   -2.696  6.018  -15.603 31.139  11.984 16.902  27.785 110.356 
If unemployed present  2.138  4.668  25.238 24.154  11.086 14.482  35.299 94.551 
Number of wage earners  -23.972**  8.39  -143.745*** 43.414  -45.101*** 12.237  -321.182*** 79.894 
Share of children 0-6  -15.648  15.206  25.903 78.686  95.815** 36.544  609.370* 238.601 
Share of children 7-17  -10.44  11.986  -34.073 62.023  81.378** 29.771  622.563** 194.376 
Share of elderly 60+  -17.696  13.328  4.67 68.967  -35.448 32.512  -167.42 212.274 
Characteristics of the head          
Age of the head  -26.02  96.18  -513.051 497.696 -82.081 216.7  -1.00E+03 1414.846 
Age of the head 2  33.769  91.377  263.429 472.842 103.772 202.766  1129.226 1323.868 
Household is literate only  -10.567  6.965  -90.700* 36.042  -8.718 16.11  -75.293 105.182 
Incomplete primary education   Reference 
Primary school completed  0.157  5.566  -44.272 28.804  -31.613* 14.794  -270.881** 96.589 
Low secondary school  6.416  7.632  -119.177** 39.494  -73.971* 31.399  -655.218** 205.005 
Upper secondary school  -5.731  7.551  -249.358*** 39.074  10.925 49.861  -46.655 325.547 
University 9.241  9.282  -433.456*** 48.03  20.185 83.244  18.883 543.507 
Industry         
Not-working/Agriculture   Reference 
Industrie/B.T.P -4.779  25.641  7.254 132.684 56.769 124.939  366.598 815.737 
Commerce/Transp./Commun./ 
  Admin.  -96.116***  10.172  -444.047*** 52.634  -43.789** 15.445  -257.349* 100.843 
Service Soci.  -1.428  7.574  6.102 39.191  27.61 28.965  247.156 189.116 
Autres services  -4.7  9.133  6.023 47.259  21.228 25.434  161.257 166.061 
Corps Exter.  -2.611  6.884  -19.401 35.621  8.742 23.042  57.723 150.44 
Chomeur -1.702  15.213  36.377 78.72  60.148 73.543  457.084 480.167 
Femme au oyeur/Eleve/Etudiant  -4.019  10.145  12.554 52.498  20.295 36.207  110.127 236.4 
Jeune enfant  -2.268  16.343  -129.322 84.567  107.247 152.23  720.704 993.92 
Vielliard/Retraite/Rentiers 1.108  8.138  48.765 42.112  25.588 34.261  154.32 223.691 
Infirme/malade 1.847  8.176  63.019 42.308  5.864 30.489  148.543 199.063 
Autre inactifs  -12.094  16.532  23.685 85.547  22.652 67.323  250.306 439.559 
Regions          
Oued Ed-Dahab-Lagouira  21.2  15.068  -135.288* 77.973 
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia El 
Hamra  -2.496  14.153  -129.348* 73.236 
Guelmime Es-Semara  7.558  13.813  -50.41 71.475  23.284 35.563  165.753 232.195 
Souss-Massa-Daraa -1.425  10.023  -54.723 51.863  -8.417 21.371  211.302 139.535 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hssen  -44.733***  11.143  -204.020*** 57.663  17.31 23.762  208.808 155.141 
Chaouia-Ouardigha -15.625  11.08  -89.734 57.333  -19.527 25.012  -201.804 163.304 
Tensift Al Haouz  -8.763  9.759  -37.2 50.5  8.732 21.097  147.015 137.74 
Oriental -18.776*  9.806  -96.129* 50.74  -0.357 25.851  99.206 168.782   35
 
G.Casablanca  -9.23  7.849  -112.350** 40.617  5.551 49.268  79.412 321.673 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer  -13.825  8.683  -118.444** 44.931  -36.873 30.677  -142.714 200.295 
Doukala Abda  -14.916  10.867  -80.126 56.232  -8.244 22.773  -3.679 148.687 
Tadla Azilal  -50.624***  12.423  -213.855*** 64.285  -51.570* 24.832  -324.785* 162.13 
Meknes Tafil  -22.753*  9.622  -126.779* 49.79  -56.111* 24.782  -311.079* 161.8 
Fes-Boulemane  -11.946  9.954  -38.193 51.509  -2.002 30.661  -5.31 200.186 
Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate  -20.264  13.982  -161.597* 72.352  16.747 22.229  80.917 145.137 
Tanger-Tetouan  Reference 
Constant 135.395***  30.386  463.951** 157.234 162.613* 72.909 959.343* 476.029 
R2 0.46  0.08  0.062  0.067   36
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Figure 4: Production/consumption decomposition of the welfare impacts for Policy 4, 
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